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Abstract
The record industry is undergoing substantial change from Internet-enabled file sharing. There is a heated
debate surrounding how record labels should react to file sharing. This paper provides a rigorous economic
analysis to identify the profit-maximization behavior for record labels. Using two widely accepted economic
models of vertical differentiation, where competing products are priced according to their relative quality, this
paper investigates the record labels’ profit-maximizing behavior under the current industry structure. It is
assumed that the quality of the music experience using a file sharing service is inferior to that of purchased
music. This methodology provides valuable insight into current practices, as well as recommendations for the
record industry. The most surprising result is that, consistent with the labels’ behavior, introducing a fee-based,
downloadable, music service usually does not increase profits. In addition, closing music sharing services,
suing ISPs and universities who are complacent about sharing, and “polluting” the pool of available music
are all in the labels’ best interest. However, a number of results also contradict current practices. On the one
hand, prices for CDs should decline with the introduction of music sharing services, recognizing that users
have an alternative to purchasing CDs. On the other hand, the record labels should aggressively introduce
content exclusively for CD purchasers to increase the quality of CDs. Sound economic analysis is key for
companies evaluating how to respond to the challenges of the Internet.
Keywords:  Economic analysis, vertical differentiation, music, file sharing, MP3
Introduction
The record industry is undergoing substantial changes from the expansion of the Internet and opportunities for transferring files.
The industry faces major opportunities, as well as substantial threats, in an era of ubiquitous network services. Opportunities arise
from new media channels for selling products. Digital downloads of music, music on demand, and complementing CD sales with
online content offer new revenue streams for the record industry. However, the threat of substitution may be an even more
formidable challenge. File sharing services, such as Napster (shut down in September 2002), KaZaA, Morpheus, Audiogalaxy,
and Grokster enable individuals to trade music files among themselves, for free. Users can easily make digital copies of their CDs
in MP3 format and redistribute the music to anyone in the world. Free file sharing threatens to cannibalize the authorized sale of
music by record labels.2
Snir/Record Labels & File Sharing
3The same transition is evident in the movie industry where movie studios actively endorsed the transition from VHS to DVD, as well as decided
on release dates for movie theaters, pay-per-view, video rental, and home purchase.
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The impact of the Internet on the industry, and appropriate responses, has long-term implications for this multibillion dollar
industry.  CD sales declined in the years 2001 and 2002 and are expected to decline in 2003. CD sales are now at 1999 levels
(RIAA 2003). The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) blames free music sharing for the decline in sales.
Investigating the causes for the decline in CD sales, Liebowitz (2003) finds support for this argument. Meanwhile, music sharing
services have seen tremendous growth. At its peak, Napster had 60 million users. Currently, CNET’s download.com sees 2.7
million downloads of KaZaA a week (Borland 2003). Industry critics contend that the success of music sharing services and
decline in sales is due to the labels’ inadequate responses to the new media (O’Reilly 2002). The labels’ main response to music
sharing is campaigning aggressively against file sharing and suing organizations that enable or even consent to music sharing
(Healey 2003).  Introducing new services and exploiting new technologies has been extremely slow. Listen.com, the first
comprehensive Internet downloading service, began its Rhapsody service only in late 2002. The first for-pay service available
for Apple users, iTunes Music Store began in April 2003. Exclusive online content for CD buyers was introduced for the first time
when Universal Music Group unveiled Bon Jovi’s CD “Bounce” in October 2002 (Hellweg 2002).
The heated debate around how the record labels should respond to the Internet has, to date, been based on very general statements
about the economic viability of introducing new services. The main question, yet unanswered, is what are the profit-maximizing
actions the record labels should undertake. Some view the popularity of music sharing services as evidence of an untapped market,
which would be willing to pay for an appropriate product. By introducing a downloadable music service, in MP3 format, the
record labels should be able to tap into this segment and increase profit (O’Reilly 2002). This argument, however, ignores the
cannibalization effect on CDs of introducing a new music format, albeit of lower quality. 
Using two widely accepted economic models of vertical differentiation, where competing products are priced according to their
relative quality, this paper investigates the record labels’ profit-maximizing behavior under the current industry structure.  Quality
in this analysis encompasses all facets of music, including, but not limited to, acquisition and enjoyment of music. It is assumed
that the quality of music, in this multi-attribute sense, using a file sharing service is inferior to that of purchased music. This
methodology, while relatively straightforward, provides valuable insight into current practices, as well as recommendations for
the recording industry. The most surprising result is that, consistent with the labels’ behavior, under a broad set of assumptions,
introducing a downloadable music service does not increase profits for record labels. In addition, closing music sharing services,
suing ISPs and universities who are complacent about sharing, and “polluting” the pool of available music are all in the labels’
best interest. However, a number of results also contradict current practices. On the one hand, prices for CDs should decline with
the introduction of music sharing services, recognizing that users have an alternative to purchasing CDs. On the other hand, the
record labels should aggressively introduce content exclusively for CD purchasers to increase CD quality. 
Quality Differentiation in Music
Music quality in this analysis is more complex than simply sound quality. In comparing different media for music distribution,
additional attributes must be taken into account. Some of the factors in the multi-attribute utility associated with a certain music
media are investment of time and effort in attaining the music, possibilities for using music in that media, social and legal
ramifications, and availability of complementary content.
 Traditionally, a record label is a monopolist provider of the music it offers. This status is conferred through a long-term, binding,
contract signed with an artist. Since individual songs and albums do not have obvious substitutes, the label disregards other
entertainment offerings. As a monopolist, the label sells music in formats it desires, taking into account consumer demand. As
in other economic analyses, a profit-maximizing label prices CDs so that only part of the market is served. Consumers with high
willingness-to-pay buy it, while others prefer not to own a copy of the music. Consistent with monopolist behavior, labels choose
which formats to offer, and have changed formats over time from vinyl records to CDs to DVD music.3  The transition from vinyl
records to CDs is viewed, in this analysis, as an example of improving quality. CDs are preferred to records for a number of
attributes: sound quality, portability, resistance to damage, and longevity. In the economic analysis it is shown that improving
music quality (in a multidimensional sense) increases labels’ profits.
Music sharing services, such as Napster or KaZaA, offer an alternative media for music distribution. As peer-to-peer networks,
they allow individuals a venue for transferring music files among themselves. Through central databases, individuals can find
Snir/Record Labels & File Sharing
4This is not to say that the quality of MP3 files must be inferior to CD music, but rather that the end-product from a file sharing service is often
inferior to a CD.
5Music from file sharing systems does have redeeming attributes that make it occasionally superior to CD music. The fact that this music is
already encoded as MP3 files makes it easier to play on a PC or MP3 player. Converting music from a CD to MP3 for similar use requires effort
by the user. If, or rather when, record labels adopt technologies that inhibit conversion of music to MP3 format, the value of music from file
sharing systems will increase. Moreover, the breadth of music is broader on these systems when compared to traditional record stores.
Notwithstanding, in this analysis it is assumed that CD music dominates file sharing music in terms of user utility.
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others who offer the music they desire and download it from the other user’s computer. While music sharing provides a substitute
to purchasing CDs, it is imperfect on many dimensions. The desire to dramatically compress music in MP3 format often produces
music of audibly inferior sound quality. High compression rates are the norm on file sharing sites and users of these services
commonly receive inferior music.4  Furthermore, the process of identifying where the desired music is offered and downloading
is time-consuming. Often, the initial attempt to download music fails, because the source version is unusable, or there are
connectivity problems. This requires identifying an alternative source for the music and attempting to download it again. If a user
desires CD-quality music, he will probably have to download the file several times from different sources. Together, these imply
that substantial effort is involved to achieve excellent sound quality, reducing the user’s utility. Moreover, occasionally,
downloaded files only appear to be music files, but instead contain computer viruses or ad-ware (Biggs 2002). 
In addition to the inherent traits of file sharing, which make shared music inferior to CDs, the record labels are acting vigorously
to de-legitimize and complicate file sharing. To this end, the RIAA sued Napster and individuals for music swapping and has
warned universities and ISPs to ban access to file sharing (Healey 2003). Lawsuits against individual users for file sharing may
explain the reduction of up to 30 percent in file sharing activity between April and June 2003 (Amdur 2003). Another venue,
which is gaining popularity among record labels, is polluting the pool of downloaded music. Overpeer offers KaZaA users a prize
if they distribute a “spoof” version of a song, instead of the real song. These files appear to be the desired song, but contain only
a portion of the song and then a commercial for the artist, advertising legitimate ways to buy the song (Maguire 2003). In the
context of this analysis, the outcome of these actions is a further reduction in the overall utility of shared music.5
Diverging quality for file sharing and CD music offer the record labels an opportunity to introduce an intermediate product.
“Internet music” could be a viable alternative for file sharing for those music listeners desiring to download music of higher
quality than offered on file sharing services for a fee. Such a service would have higher quality for a number of reasons: it would
be legitimate, removing legal and ethical questions; there would not be any uncertainty regarding the authenticity and
completeness of the downloaded file; files can be encoded at different compression rates depending on the user’s preferences for
downloading time, file size, and music quality; and threats of viruses or other unwanted files would be eliminated. Several services
are currently available including pressplay.com, Listen.com, musicnet.com, emusic.com, and iTunes Music Store from Apple.
CD quality can also be enhanced using Internet technologies. Record labels can leverage the Internet to provide expanded content
exclusively to CD owners. Providing access to online movie clips and detailed information about the artists and bands involved
in creating the music increases the value of CD ownership. The first instance of exclusive online content was Bon Jovi’s CD
“Bounce” by Universal Music Group in late 2002 (Hellweg 2002). Other labels followed almost immediately with similar online
content for their new CD releases.
General Model
We model behavior in the recording industry by focusing on the smallest viable piece of music, either a compact disk (CD) or
a single song on a CD. A record label is assumed to own all legal reproduction and performance rights, including selling CDs or
digital distribution on the Internet. As such, the label is a monopolist provider with decision authority over distribution channels.
In addition to authorized distribution channels, the same music is available for free using a file sharing system. In this analysis
there are three different media for music: CDs, denoted by C; Internet music (downloadable for a fee), denoted by I; and file
sharing, denoted by F. It is assumed that the marginal cost of producing music in each media is negligible.
Snir/Record Labels & File Sharing
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products are not available. However, the derivation here follows immediately from their analysis.
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We assume a multi-attribute utility function across the population, with agreement on the relationship between the various
attributes and an item’s overall quality. The quality of music using media j, j={C,I,F}, is denoted by qj , [ , ]. Based on theq q
previous discussion we assume that 0 <  # qF < qI < qC # .q q
Consumers in the market for a specific music item have unit demand. Each consumer either has access to the music or does not.
Consumers differ by a taste parameter 2 , [ , ], with higher values of 2 associated with placing more value on the music. Theθ θ
value of music using media j to consumer with taste parameter 2i is v(2i,qj), which is increasing in 2. If the price of media j is pj,
the net utility for a consumer with taste parameter 2i is
U(2i,qj,pj) = v(2i,qj) – pj (3.1)
A result from equation (3.1) is that if consumer 21 prefers product j at price pj to inferior products, consumers with higher values
of 2 will also prefer product j to inferior products.
This framework is the foundation for the label’s strategic behavior. The file sharing service is not viewed as a strategic, profit
maximizing entity because it offers its services for free. The label behaves as a monopolist, deciding CD price, whether to offer
Internet music, and choosing quality and price for Internet music. The label’s profit ( ) is composed of two components:  profitπ R
from CD sales, denoted by , and profit from Internet music ( ). π C π I
The nature of the decisions generates a three-stage game. The first stage involves deciding whether to offer Internet music. In the
second stage the label chooses the quality of Internet music.  Prices for CDs and Internet music are chosen in stage three. As in
other strategic games, the solution is derived by backwards induction (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991), solving first the pricing
decisions, then quality, and finally whether to introduce Internet music.
The general case, for arbitrary v(2i,qj) and 2 ~ F(2), does not generate meaningful results for the label’s decisions. To analyze
behavior, we restrict attention to two functional forms. These forms are often used in the quality-differentiation literature and
provide insight into the range of decision scenarios. The first is based on the vertical differentiation literature (see Bhargava and
Choudhary 2001, 2002; Tirole 1998, p. 296). A tri-modal distribution is analyzed as well, with a different relationship between
quality and value for different customer “types” based on the price discrimination literature (see Varian 1989).  In both cases the
market size is assumed to equal 1, w.l.o.g.
Scenario 1:  Linear Value Function
Case A:  Vertical Differentiation
Following the vertical differentiation literature (see Bhargava and Choudhary 2001; Tirole 1998, p. 296) it is assumed that
customers differ in their taste parameter for quality (2), but the relationship between quality and value is linear for all customers.
Formally, denote 2i as the taste parameter for customer i, then
U(2i,qj,pj) = v(2i,qj) – pj = 2iqj – pj (4.1)
For ease of exposition this case is Case A and superscripts are used to denote cases.
The analysis in the scenario follows the derivation in Bhargava and Choudhary (2001).6  The distribution of taste (2) has a cdf
of F(2) and pdf f(2). In identifying the profit opportunity from introducing new alternatives, it is useful to constrain the hazard
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hazard rate.7  This property holds for a wide range of commonly used distributions including uniform, binomial, exponential, and








With these assumptions, the nature of competition between a monopolist label and free file sharing can be analyzed. It is assumed
that customers have access to file sharing and that it offers an imperfect substitute to purchased music. The label offers CDs and
is deliberating whether to offer Internet music as a second distribution media. In addition, the label has to choose prices for CDs
and Internet music. It is shown, in the following analysis, that introducing Internet music is not profit maximizing (similar to the
results of Bhargava and Choudhary 2001).
Customers are differentiated in this market by their taste parameter 2  , [ , ]. They face three alternatives when the label offersθ θ
both CDs and Internet music and file sharing exists. There are two critical points, dividing customers into three regions. Define
the taste parameter for the customer who is indifferent between file sharing and Internet music as , and for the customer whoθ AC1
is indifferent between Internet music and CD music as  (where superscripts denote cases), with  # , Figure 1 depictsθ AC 2 θ AC1 θ AC 2
the relationship between these critical points and customer preferences. Customers with 2  #  prefer file sharing, customersθ AC1
with < 2 <  prefer Internet music, and those with < 2  prefer CDs. θ AC1 θ AC 2 θ AC 2
Figure 1.  Market Share for Differentiated Products
To identify these critical points, we identify the customer who is indifferent between two options. Customers who prefer Internet
music to file sharing have (from 4.1)
U I(2i,qj,pj) $ UF(2i,qj,pj)   ⇔   2qI –  $2qF – pF  =  2qFp AI







A similar analysis for the preference of CDs to Internet music shows that










Given these preferences, the demand for each product is
For CDs:  = 1 – (4.5a)D AC )( 2θF
A
C
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For file sharing:  = (4.5c)D AF )( 1θF
A
C
Thus, the record label’s profit maximization problem is







































Analyzing the profit function yields the main result for this scenario. A profit-maximizing record label prefers not to introduce
Internet music, as shown in Proposition 1. 
Proposition 1: With a linear relationship between quality and value, and when F(2) has a non-decreasing hazard rate, a profit
maximizing label offers a single product.
Proof:8 




















































= solve {2 = ((2)} (4.8)θ AC 2
Since ((2) is non-decreasing in 2, is unique.θ AC 2






























































= solve {2 = ((2)} (4.10)θ AC1
Note that the equation defining (4.10) is identical to the one defining (4.8). Thus, =  and Internet music willθ AC1 θ AC 2 θ AC1 θ AC 2
be priced by the label to have zero market share. QED
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The key result here is that adding the option of offering Internet music does not increase profit. If it is offered, Internet music is
priced to realize zero market share. This explains the labels’ balking at early introduction of online music services. The intuition
for this result is that Internet music is a substitute for CD music, cannibalizing CD sales.
Case B:  Only CDs Offered
Another question of interest is what impact file sharing has on record label profit when only CDs are offered. In this case (Case
B), there is only one critical point , with θ BC1






demand for CDs is: = (1– ) (4.11b)D BC )( 1θF
B
C
and the label’s profit is:  = (1– ) (4.11c)π BC p BC )( 1θF
B
C
From the proof of Proposition 1 (4.8), the optimal solution is
= solve {2 = ((2)} (4.12)θ BC1
Corollary 1 shows that file sharing reduces the label’s profit and that its quality is important for the label. Increasing the quality
of the free substitute reduces profit. 
Corollary 1: With a linear relationship between quality and value, and F(2) exhibiting a non-decreasing hazard rate, the label’s
market share remains constant, while price and profit are increasing in CD quality and decreasing in file sharing
quality.
Proof: 
From (4.12), and demand (4.11b), depend only on the distribution of 2, not the parameters , qC, qF.θ BC1 p BC
To maintain constant market share, price changes positively to qC and negatively to qF. Profit is positively related to price, from
(4.11c), so price and profit change as described. QED
The result of Corollary 1 appears counterintuitive at first.  Why is maintaining market-share an optimal response to the
introduction of file sharing? A simple example shows that this result is derived from a common result in monopoly pricing. When
taste is distributed 2 ~ U[0,1] the monopolist label faces a linear, downward-sloping, demand curve. Demand in this case is, from












− p BC 2
qq FC −
so =½ and exactly half the market is served. Constant market-share is a well-known result when a monopolist faces a linear,θ BC1
downward-sloping, demand curve.
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Corollary 1 provides insight into the changes we would expect to see when Napster and later KaZaA were introduced. File sharing
offers customers an alternative. The record label’s optimal response is to lower prices in order to preserve market share. Lowering
prices reduces profit. However, this is not the venue chosen by the labels. Prices have been increasing over the past few years
(Leibowitz 2003), making substitutes more attractive. As a result, some consumers who previously purchased CDs are now
choosing file sharing services as their preferred venue for getting music. Price-sensitive consumers with Internet access are the
most likely to adopt file sharing services. This is consistent with data from the RIAA that shows that the decline in CD purchasing
is most pronounced for the 20 to 30 year-old age group (RIAA 2003). 
Two additional results are evident from Corollary 1. First, improving CD quality increases profit, indicating that the labels should
enhance new technologies that add value to customers. Second, profit is negatively related to the quality of file sharing, suggesting
that the label is interested in lowering the quality of file sharing. This is consistent with the record labels’ extensive campaign
against file sharing services and their users.
Scenario 2:  Tri-Modal Distribution of Taste
The previous analysis, where quality is linearly related to customer value, suggests that the record label should not introduce
Internet music. One explanation for this counterintuitive result is that it depends on the assumed linear relationship between
quality and value.  Results would differ with a different relationship (Bhargava and Choudhary 2002; Denekere and McAfee
1996). To address this issue we analyze the label’s behavior when customer taste follows a tri-modal distribution and quality
sensitive customers place increasing value on quality. There are three types of customers i = l, m, h, with taste parameters 2i such
that 2l < 2m < 2h.  The ratio of each customer type is ri with rl + rm + rh =1.
Additionally, the relationship between quality and value is assumed to differ among customer types. It is assumed that for 2l and
2m customers, value increases linearly with quality, while a quadratic relationship (which is convex) exists for 2h customers.














A final set of assumptions is that (qC + qF) > 1; (qI + qF) > 1 and (qC + qI) > 1. These assumptions are not restrictive because the
taste parameter (2) is unconstrained.
This model follows the second degree price discrimination literature (e.g., Denekere and McAfee 1996; Varian 1989) where a
monopolist chooses prices to segment users, with users self-selecting the “appropriate” product. It is often assumed in this
literature that the quality-value relationship differs across customers (e.g., Varian 1989, 2000). The price discrimination literature
identifies two types of constraints. One is an individual rationality (IR) constraint, which states that a consumer will not have
negative utility. The second is the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint, which determines that a consumer behaves in his own
self-interest. When the IC constraint holds a consumer self-selects to purchase the appropriate product. Formally, these require:
œi at type i’s chosen j  IRi,j: U(2i,qj,pj) = v(2i,qj) – pj $ 0 (5.2)
For customer type i to prefer product j over product k at given prices
ICi,j: œk … j     U(2i,qj,pj) $ U(2i,qk,pk)     ⇔     v(2i,qj) – pj $  v(2i,qk)– pk (5.3)
Case C:  Monopolist Record Label Facing Free File Sharing
When free file sharing is available, users have multiple choices. This requires the label to price CDs to attract desired customers,
assuring that relevant IC constraints are not violated. 
If the label desires that only customers of taste parameter2h buy CDs, their IC constraints binds, given their alternatives:
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From ICh,C: 2h  –  $ 2h  –  = 2h  – 0 so:  # 2h(  – ) (5.4a)qC
2 )(θ hCCp qF
2 pCF qF
2 )(θ hCCp qC
2 qF
2
By choosing price  = 2h(  – ) other segments prefer file sharing over CD purchases, and profit from segment 2h)(θ hCCp qC
2 qF
2
is maximized. Profit is
= rh2h(  – ) (5.4b))(θπ hCC qC
2 qF
2
If the label desires that customers of taste parameter 2h and 2m buy CDs, the IC constraints for both these groups have to hold:
From ICh,C: 2h –  $ 2h  so:   # 2h(  – )qC
2 ),( θθ mhCCp qF
2 ),( θθ mhCCp qC
2 qF
2
And for 2m customers:2mqC –  $ 2mqF so:   # 2m(qC – qF)),( θθ mhCCp ),( θθ mh
C
Cp
So the label chooses10  = 2m(qC – qF), 2l customers prefer file sharing and profit is),( θθ mh
C
Cp
 =  (rm + rh)2m(qC – qF) (5.5)),( θθπ mhCC
Comparing (5.4b) and (5.5) indicates when the label prefers to sell to 2h customers and when he prefers selling to 2h and 2m
customers. The condition for preferring only 2h customers is denoted as Relationship 2:
R2:          rh2h(qC + qF) $ (rm + rh)2m
Similarly, the label prefers to sell to both 2h and 2m customers when R2 does not hold (denoted by ).  Figure 2 shows these2R
relationships.
Introduction of file sharing and increasing its quality adversely affect the label’s profit and require price reductions. In both (5.4)
and (5.5) profit is decreasing in qF. Hence, the labels are aggressively campaigning against file sharing services.  Similarly, the
label has an incentive to maximize the quality of CDs.
Case D:  Record Label Offers CDs and Internet Music While File Sharing is Free
When faced with free file sharing, the label may want to version the music product. Offering a lower quality product, such as
Internet music, at a lower price should induce some of the customers with low willingness-to-pay to adopt Internet music. In
essence, the label is trying to “steal back” customers from the file sharing alternative (O’Reilly 2002). Internet music would be
introduced and targeted to 2m customers with CDs targeted to 2h customers. To achieve this segmentation, prices for CDs and
Internet music are chosen so that customers self-select the appropriate product. While it is intuitively appealing to believe that
Internet music can divert users from file sharing, economic analysis shows that it is not always profitable. The following
exposition derives conditions for profitable introduction of Internet music. These conditions are neither universal nor intuitive,
justifying the reluctance to introduce Internet music. 
This analysis is limited to the case where the label targets CDs only to 2h customers; Internet music is targeted to 2m customers;
and 2l users adopt file sharing. Other combinations are worthy of consideration, but do not provide additional insight. With this
allocation of products to consumers we have three sets of IC constraints. Each customer segment has to prefer their allocated
product to the other two offerings.
For type 2h this implies
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Figure 2.  Profit form Various Offerings:  Facing Free File Sharing
From ICh,I: 2h –  $ 2h –      ⇔      –  # 2h(  – ) (5.6a)qC
2 )(θ hDCp qI







From ICh,F: 2h –  $ 2h         ⇔      # 2h(  – ) (5.6b)qC
2 )(θ hDCp qF
2 )(θ hDCp qC
2 qF
2
Requiring, for customer segment 2m











From ICl,C: 2lqF $ 2lqC –      ⇔      $ 2l(qC – qF) (5.8a))(θ hDCp )(θ h
D
Cp
From ICl,I: 2lqF $ 2lqI –      ⇔      $ 2l(qI – qF) (5.8b))(θ mDIp )(θ m
D
Ip
Together these equations constrain feasible prices to segment the customer base. Equation (5.6b) constrains CD prices so that 2h
customers prefer CDs to file sharing, similar to equation (5.4a) earlier. Equations (5.6a) and (5.7a) constrain the difference in price
between CDs and Internet music to assure segmentation. Constraints (5.7b) and (5.8b) require that Internet music is priced to
attract 2m customers, not 2l customers.
It can be shown that offering CDs to segment 2h at a price equal to the value of CDs to these customers presents a product-price
combination which violates the IC constraint of segment 2m. (A similar result is shown in Varian 2000.) As a result, the label
maximizes profit by extracting surplus from 2m customers (constraint 5.7b) and pricing CDs so that (5.6a) holds. Formally, set
 = 2m(qI – qF) (5.9a))(θ mDIp
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Other constraints hold from the assumptions on taste (2l < 2m < 2h) and product quality (qI < qC). The label’s profit is









= (rm + rh)2m(qI – qF) + rh2h( – ) (5.10)qC
2 qI
2
With the segmenting pricing scheme identified, the question remains when the label increases profit by introducing Internet music.
This has to be verified against two different initial situations. When faced with a file sharing competitor (equations 5.4 and 5.5),
the label initially chooses to target only 2h customers when R2 holds (i.e., rh2h(qC + qF) $ (rm + rh)2m), otherwise he initially targets
both 2h and 2m customers (when ). The profit implications of introducing Internet music are shown in Propositions 2 and 3.2R
Proposition 2: When R2 holds, initially the record label prices CDs to attract only 2h customers. When file sharing is
available, introducing Internet music and segmenting customers increases profit when






Proof:   From (5.4b) and (5.10): < )(θπ hCC π DR





⇔ rh2h( – ) < (rm + rh)2m(qI – qF)qI
2 qF
2
⇔ rh2h(qI + qF) < (rm + rh)2m
On the other hand, from R2: (rm + rh)2m < rh2h(2C + qF)
Combining the two results and rearranging yields (5.11) QED
Equation (5.11) indicates that the range of increased profitability from introducing Internet music is quite narrow when R2 holds.








the quality level of Internet music. If Internet music is of high quality, the LHS is violated, and the label prefers to serve only 2h
customers (from R2). The intuition for this is that a high quality intermediate-product reduces the viable price for CDs (5.9b). In
essence, the label prefers that CDs compete with file sharing, rather than Internet music. Since the label initially preferred not to
serve 2m customers, serving these customers has a high risk of cannibalization. 
This is demonstrated in Figure 2, which shows when R2 holds and the profit implications of introducing Internet music for a given
set of parameters. If the ratio of 2m customers (rm) is very low, the label prefers to offer only CDs, targeting high type customers
(R2 holds). In this region offering Internet music with qI =1.5 forces the label to lower the price for CDs, reducing profit. As rm
increases, the profitability of Internet music increases. 
When R2 does not hold, there is a different narrow range for increased profit from Internet music.
Proposition 3: When R2 does not hold, the record label initially prices CDs to attract both 2h and 2m customers. When file
sharing is available introducing Internet music and segmenting customers increases profit when:






Snir/Record Labels & File Sharing
2003 — Twenty-Fourth International Conference on Information Systems 83
Proof: From (5.5) and (5.10): < ),( θθπ mhCC π
D
R
⇔ (rm + rh)2m(qC – qF) < (rm + rh)2m(qI – qF) + rh2h( – )qC
2 qI
2
⇔ (rm + rh)2m(qC – qI) < rh2h( – )qC
2 qI
2
⇔ (rm + rh)2m < rh2h(qC + qI)
On the other hand, from :  rh2h(qC + qF) < (rm + rh)2m 2R
Combining the two results and rearranging yields (5.12) QED
In this situation the quality of Internet music has to be sufficiently high for its profitable introduction, because initially the label
preferred to serve both 2h and 2m segments (from ). The label introduces Internet music at a lower price than CDs for 2m2R
customers, while raising the price on CDs for 2h customers. If the reduction in price and profit from offering Internet music is too
severe, the label prefers not to offer this media. Since the price for Internet music is linearly related to its quality, higher quality
for this media raises profit. This generates a minimal quality level for Internet music to be profitable and CD quality constrains
the maximal quality of Internet music. Returning to Figure 2, when rm is too high, the label prefers to offer only CDs at a price
that is attractive to both 2h and 2m customers.
Once optimal prices are known, the next stage is choosing quality levels, knowing how prices react to quality. Optimal quality
policies for CDs and file sharing remain unchanged when Internet music is available. The label still prefers to raise CD quality
and lower file sharing quality (from 5.10). Obviously there are technological limitations to both of these, but the general insight
remains that these changes are in the label’s best interest. Choosing the quality of Internet music involves a trade-off between
raising prices and profit from 2m customers against cannibalizing prices and profit from CD sales. The optimal quality level is











Returning to Figure 2, the decreased profit from introducing Internet music stems from the fact that its quality is set. Optimizing
the quality of Internet music would improve the profit of this alternative somewhat. However, setting this quality has to be aligned
with the constraints on qI (qF < qI < qC). In Figure 2, there are two regions where it is unprofitable to offer Internet music. In the
left region, the label targets 2h customers (R2 holds). Here the ideal alternate product would be of equal quality to file sharing,
generating zero profit. In the right region (where R2 does not hold), the ideal alternate product is identical to CD music, indicating
that differentiation is mute. 
Discussion
This paper identifies the economic impact of recent changes in the music industry. According to many industry notables, the
record labels have taken the wrong path in responding to the Internet and threats of file sharing (O’Reilly 2002). Critics often
complain that the industry places too much emphasis on combating file sharing, rather than adopting the Internet as a new media
for distributing music and increasing customer value (O’Reilly 2002).
A key contribution of this paper is assessing the merit of various suggestions from an economic perspective. This analysis forms
the basis of recommendations. Consistent with the criticism of the industry, part of the response to file sharing should be lowering
the price of CDs. This maximizes the labels’ profits when there exists a free, low-quality substitute by reducing the attractiveness
of file sharing (O’Reilly 2002). Furthermore, both models show that the labels benefit from increasing the quality of CDs.
Embracing the Internet to provide exclusive content for buyers of CDs as a means of expanding entertainment value for buyers
of legitimate music would increase the quality and profit of CD sales. 
Snir/Record Labels & File Sharing
84 2003— Twenty-Fourth International Conference on Information Systems
Economic analysis also indicates that the RIAA’s aggressive legal and advertising action against file sharing increases the labels’
profit. Examples of these actions are the lawsuits against Napster and other file-sharing systems; suing individual users and
distributors of copyrighted music (Healey 2003); and polluting the pool of shared music (Maguire 2003). From an economic
perspective these actions are aimed at impeding and de-legitimizing music sharing. The net result is reducing the quality of file
sharing for potential users, as evidenced by the recent reduction in music sharing (Amdur 2003).
Contrary to the criticism of the labels, however, online distribution of music does not always increase the labels’ profits. This
justifies the labels’ slow adoption of technologies for direct downloading of music, such as Rhapsody (available from Listen.com)
and the recently announced iTunes Music Store from Apple (Pogue 2003). For these services to be profitable, they have to target
a niche audience while not cannibalizing CD sales. Economic analysis shows that with a linear relationship between quality and
value, the record labels do not increase profit by introducing a second product. However, when the relationship between quality
and value varies across customers, there is a narrow opportunity for a profitable Internet music service. The potential profit and
optimal quality of this service depend on the distribution of taste and the quality of CDs and file sharing.
Conclusion
Free distribution of information goods will have much broader effects than the music industry. Other forms of entertainment, such
as movies, are already seeing the first examples of potential file sharing threats, while considering ways of embracing the Internet
to facilitate video-on-demand as a new product. Software makers also face competition from free information goods. Here the
threat is from open-source software, which offers an imperfect substitute for traditional software development efforts. Economic
analysis of profitable opportunities for other industries will provide guidance for traditional players in responding to networking
technologies.
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